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RESPONSE 
  
What Kind of Discrimination Does the Voting Rights Act Target? 
CHRISTOPHER S. ELMENDORF† 
 
In response to Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Response, Section 2 is Dead:  
Long Live Section 2, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 219 (2012), 
http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/01-2012/Charles.pdf, and Luis 
Fuentes-Rohwer, Response, Justice Kennedy to the Rescue?, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 209 (2012), http://www. pennumbra.com/responses/01-
2012/FuentesRohwer.pdf. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In Volume 160 of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, I pre-
sent an interpretive reconstruction of the Voting Rights Act’s (VRA) 
core provision of nationwide application, Section 2.1  My account re-
sponds to longstanding critiques of Section 2 as utterly opaque, likely 
to worsen racial conflict, and probably unconstitutional (because in-
adequately tethered to the prevention or remediation of actual  
constitutional violations). 
My paper builds upon a shared premise of liberal and conservative 
jurists:  that the Voting Rights Act was meant “to hasten the waning of 
 
†
 Professor of Law, University of California at Davis.  Thanks to Guy Charles and 
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer for their thoughtful Responses to my Article, and to Rick Pildes 
for prodding me to say a little more about what constitutes “race-biased decisionmak-
ing” for purposes of Section 2. 
1 See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2:  Of Biased Votes, Unconstitu-
tional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 377 (2012). 
Elmendorf.doc (DO NOT DELETE)  4/24/2012 10:54 AM 
358 University of Pennsylvania Law Review PENNumbra [Vol. 160: 357 
racism in American politics.”2  Professor Guy-Uriel Charles responds, 
“[T]his move is question-begging:  what is racism in American politics, 
and how will we know whether it is waning?”3  I agree with Professor 
Charles that the apparent consensus against racial discrimination in 
America is somewhat illusory, resting on divergent understandings of 
what constitutes discrimination on the basis of race.4  But I disagree 
with the thrust of Professor Charles’s Response, namely, that reading 
Section 2 to target state action that discriminates on the basis of race 
(1) does little to help lawyers and judges applying the statute, given 
the lack of societal consensus about the meaning of discrimination,5 
and (2) is essentially pointless, because the Fourteenth and  
Fifteenth Amendments already prohibit race-discriminatory state  
action with respect to elections.6   
Let me start by briefly restating how my account of Section 2 would 
operate in the courts: 
 
• Plaintiffs would have to trace the electoral inequality at 
issue to race-biased decisionmaking by conventional state 
actors or by the electorate.7  A decision is race-biased if 
 
2 See id. at 395 & n.89 (quoting and discussing two Supreme Court opinions in 
which liberal and conservative justices agree on the purpose of the VRA).  
3 Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Response, Section 2 is Dead:  Long Live Section 2, 160 U. PA. 
L. REV. PENNUMBRA 219, 223 (2012), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/ 
01-2012/Charles.pdf. 
4 See id. at 222-24; see also, e.g., R. Richard Banks et al., Discrimination and Implicit Bias 
in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1170 (2006) (arguing that “the 
ostensible consensus fractures as one moves from broad statements of principle to 
specific circumstances”); Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law 
and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1085-86 (2006) (noting disagree-
ment over whether antidiscrimination norms should be understood to prohibit “Bayes-
ian bigot[ry],” i.e., discrimination grounded in statistically valid inferences about an 
individual’s likely characteristics based on observations of American society). 
5 See Charles, supra note 3, at 222-24. 
6 See id. at 223 (“[I]f racial animus is the evil that Section 2 is seeking to eradicate, 
then it is not clear what [Section 2, so interpreted,] would add to the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendment standards . . . .”).  To be clear, the points to which I am 
responding in this short Reply do not comprise the entirety of Professor Charles’s 
thoughtful Response.  He also observes, for example, that my account of Section 2’s 
constitutionality is “like a game of Jenga,” consisting of “a series of arguments that 
build on each other but . . . become more precarious as each block is added to the 
tower.”  Id. at 225.  I like the metaphor, and I agree that my argument has a Jenga-like 
quality, though I would like to think that the tower is stable, even if not engineered for 
redundancy.  Professor Charles also suggests that as a society, we might be better off 
with a universal VRA concerned with all forms of voting discrimination, not just dis-
crimination on the basis of race.  See id. at 226.  He may well be right.  But my article 
was written about the VRA we have, not the one I would create if starting anew. 
7 See Elmendorf, supra note 1, at 421-36. 
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it “would have been different had the race of persons 
considered by the decisionmaker been different.”8 
• Though plaintiffs must make a showing of race-biased 
decisionmaking, this showing need not comport with 
conventional evidentiary standards.  It suffices for 
plaintiffs to show bias to a significant likelihood, rather 
than proving it more likely than not.9    
• Consistent with the substantive and evidentiary norms I 
have just bulleted and with the common law’s norm of 
incremental legal change, courts would have broad dis-
cretion to decide (1) what types of electoral structures 
may be challenged under Section 2 and, correlatively, 
what remedies a judge may order;10 (2) whether to limit 
the reach of Section 2 through proximate causation 
requirements or state-interest balancing;11 and (3) 
whether to establish presumptions to narrow the judi-
cial inquiry and to constrain judicial discretion, either 
across the board or in certain classes of high-stakes cases.12  
 
Now, would a Section 2 that operates in this way be normatively in-
determinate, or redundant with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments?  Regarding the indeterminacy objection, although law 
professors may be hopelessly divided over how to define racial discrim-
ination, constitutional law is not, and statutes enacted pursuant to the 
enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
should be read for normative consistency with those Amendments 
when possible.13  It is of course well established that the antidiscrimi-
 
8 Id. at 384. 
9 See, e.g., id. at 421-30. 
10 See id. at 404-55.  To be sure, the courts must, at a minimum, read Section 2 to 
permit “dilution” challenges to at-large elections and multi-member districts, as well as 
challenges to certain “participation” injuries regardless of whether they result in 
actionable vote dilution.  This much was clearly contemplated by the enacting Con-
gress.  See Elmendorf, supra note 1, at 418-21 (regarding participation claims); Michael 
J. Pitts, The Voting Rights Act and the Era of Maintenance, 59 ALA. L. REV. 903, 918-19 
(2008) (regarding dilution claims). 
11 See Elmendorf, supra note 1, at 445-46 (discussing such limitations as a possible 
response to worries about the statute’s “congruence and proportionality”). 
12 Id. at 439, 450-51 (discussing constitutional and prudential norms that should 
govern judicial discretion under election-related statutes).   
13 There are precedents for such a presumption in favor of normative consistency, 
see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1376-77 
(1988), and the presumption would help resolve constitutional doubts about the con-
gruence and proportionality of otherwise questionable exercises of the enforcement 
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nation provisions of the Constitution reach state actions that adversely 
impact minorities only if they were undertaken “because of” the race, 
sex, religion, etc., of the disadvantaged persons.14  It is also clear that 
good intentions are generally not a defense to the State’s use of race 
as a decisional criterion.  Racial classifications face strict scrutiny 
whether drawn to oppress a historically disadvantaged group or to 
help it achieve socioeconomic parity.15  Nor may the government use 
protected-class status as a proxy in furtherance of normatively unrelated 
objectives.16  Even if there is a robust statistical correlation between 
class membership and some harder-to-observe trait or behavior, the 
Constitution disallows use of the proxy unless the government has a 
compelling objective and no other way to achieve it.17 
The point is, a reasonably well-settled body of law about what kinds 
of racial discrimination render state action presumptively unconstitu-
tional already exists.  To be sure, some important questions remain 
open.  Are formally race-neutral actions taken “because of” the actor’s 
subconscious racial biases presumptively unconstitutional?  (I would 
say yes, but as a matter of positive law, the answer is uncertain.18)  Are 
 
power, see Elmendorf, supra note 1, at 414, 428-30.  But see Bertrall L. Ross II, Against 
Constitutional Mainstreaming, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206-07 (2011) (making the 
case against reading the Voting Rights Act to conform to constitutional norms).  
14 See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (stating that a 
law violates the Equal Protection Clause “only if [a disproportionate impact] can be 
traced to a discriminatory purpose”); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) 
(“[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, with-
out regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional 
solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.”).  
15 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (overruling Metro 
Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), and holding that “all racial classifications . . . 
must be strictly scrutinized); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490-91 
(1989) (holding that the use of a racial classification for benign or compensatory pur-
poses does not rescue the classification from strict scrutiny).   
16 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550 (1996) (stating that “general-
izations about ‘the way women are,’ [and] estimates of what is appropriate for most 
women, no longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talent and capacity 
place them outside the average description”). 
17 See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 507 (2005) (applying strict scrutiny 
to California’s practice of segregating inmates by race during a sixty-day evaluation 
period, notwithstanding undisputed evidence concerning violent prison gangs orga-
nized along racial lines); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.11  
(1994) (stating that gender-based classifications that utilize stereotypes violate the  
Equal Protection Clause “even when some statistical support can be conjured  
up for the generalization”). 
18 The uncertainty exists because the Court has both (1) frequently treated the 
“because of race” standard as if it were an “intentional discrimination” standard, e.g., 
Davis, 426 U.S. at 240, and (2) long insisted that the Equal Protection Clause is centrally 
concerned with stereotyping, see supra text accompanying notes 16-17, which operates 
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formally race-neutral actions with a racially integrative purpose pre-
sumptively unconstitutional, or are they exempt from strict scrutiny 
because the State’s use of race was ameliorative and concealed?  
(Again, the law is uncertain, though Justice Kennedy seems to think it 
is often permissible to pursue racial integration objectives using race-
neutral means.19)  Eventually these questions will be answered, and the 
courts’ understanding of what constitutes objectionable race-biased 
decisionmaking for purposes of Section 2 should evolve accordingly. 
Reading Section 2 in this way would not make it redundant with 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.  Section 2 on my account 
provides additional protections.  Most obviously, it alleviates the evi-
dentiary burden on plaintiffs.  Litigants suing under Section 2 must 
establish only a significant likelihood of bias, rather than prove bias 
more likely than not.20  Section 2 also enables plaintiffs to obtain 
prophylactic or quasi-compensatory relief for a class of constitutional 
violations that are otherwise nonjusticiable—specifically, election out-
 
on an automatic or subconscious level.  Several Justices have suggested that the Equal 
Protection Clause reaches subconsciously discriminatory state action.  See, e.g., Adarand, 
515 U.S. at 274 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, J.) (“Bias both conscious 
and unconscious, reflecting traditional and unexamined habits of thought, keeps up 
barriers that must come down if equal opportunity and nondiscrimination are ever 
genuinely to become this country’s law and practice.”).  However, the Court has never 
squarely faced this question. 
19 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
788-90 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (identifying several contexts in which race-
conscious actions by a school board are permissible).  For a careful analysis of the con-
stitutional status of race-neutral measures designed to enhance opportunities for 
underrepresented racial groups, see Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of 
Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 GEO. L.J. 2331 (2000). 
20 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.  I concede that requiring plaintiffs to 
make a significant-likelihood showing could substantially increase their evidentiary 
burden, relative to the status quo in circuits that do not presently require any showing 
concerning the reasons for race-correlated voting patterns.  However, the marginal 
cost of this requirement should not be prohibitive.  As our society becomes more 
multiethnic and our neighborhoods become more integrated, the conventional statis-
tical techniques for estimating racial voting patterns on the basis of aggregate data 
break down.  See D. James Greiner, Re-Solidifying Racial Bloc Voting:  Empirics and Legal 
Doctrine in the Melting Pot, 86 IND. L.J. 447, 451 (2011).  Greiner argues convincingly 
that plaintiffs will need to combine aggregate data with individual-level data, collected 
through exit polls, in order to reliably estimate racial voting patterns.  See id. at 481-84 
(discussing alternative quantitative measures to discern legally cognizable discrimina-
tion).  In the exit poll, researchers could include questions about the respondent’s 
racial beliefs, questions that tap racial resentment, and experimental vignettes de-
signed to detect the respondent’s use of candidate race as a decisional criterion.  As 
well, courts could develop burden-shifting frameworks that presume race-biased vot-
ing in regions where the white population scores high on measures of racial bias. 
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comes that are unconstitutional because the electorate made its 
choice “because of” race.21 
I readily acknowledge, however, that reading Section 2 to require a 
showing of race-biased decisionmaking and using the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments to delimit racial bias will not relieve the courts 
of tough judgment calls.  My account of Section 2 clarifies how the 
statute should be understood broadly, and it rules out some concep-
tions of what constitutes a race-biased decision for purposes of the 
statute, such as definitions premised on the impact of the decision 
rather than on the behavior and beliefs of the decisionmakers.22  
However, my account does not instruct courts how to exercise their 
considerable remaining discretion. 
To illustrate the point, consider five hypothetical cases, each aris-
ing in a biracial jurisdiction.  In each case, plaintiffs challenge at-large 
elections and seek a single-member district remedy.  In each case, 
plaintiffs make a showing of race-biased decisionmaking by the elec-
torate (more precisely, by a portion of the electorate sufficient to con-
trol the outcome of at-large elections in the jurisdiction).  Plaintiffs do 
not allege that the State adopted or maintained the at-large system  
for discriminatory reasons. 
The first case is brought by black voters, who show that white can-
didates regularly make racial appeals and regularly win, owing to deep-
seated racial animus on the part of the white majority.  The second and 
third cases are also brought by black voters, but here the showings of 
majority-group bias are rather different.  In one case, whites are reluc-
tant to vote for black candidates not because of animus per se, but 
because white voters assume that black candidates are generally less 
honest and hardworking than white candidates.  In the other case, 
whites resist voting for black candidates because they think—and let’s 
assume they are correct—that black candidates are more liberal on 
average than white candidates. 
In the fourth case, white voters are willing to support black candi-
dates, but only conservative black candidates who promise to disman-
tle social programs that disproportionately benefit black citizens.  The 
evidence shows that whites in the jurisdiction have abnormally high 
 
21 See Elmendorf, supra note 1, at 430-47 (explaining why such election outcomes 
are unconstitutional and why “electorate motive” challenges to the result of elections 
for representatives should nonetheless be deemed nonjusticiable). 
22 See id. at 428 (stating that “a pure disparate impact test . . . would be a very clumsy 
device” for identifying electoral arrangements that are unconstitutionally discriminatory). 
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levels of what some social scientists call “racial resentment.”23  They 
believe that black people no longer face significant barriers to oppor-
tunity and that problems afflicting black communities are largely due 
to culture, poor choices, or weak effort. 
In the fifth case, the table is turned.  The plaintiffs are white con-
servatives who cannot elect their candidates of choice because the juris-
diction’s at-large elections are controlled by a cross-racial coalition of 
lower-income blacks who vote their economic interests and affluent 
whites who vote their “racial guilt,” as the plaintiffs style it.  Plaintiffs 
argue that if white members of the majority coalition were not so 
focused on the racial consequences of redistributive programs, then 
the plaintiffs would have a better chance of uniting with them and 
electing the plaintiffs’ candidates of choice.  The plaintiffs seek re-
placement of at-large elections with single-member districts, and de-
mand that at least one of the new districts be “majority white 
conservative” in terms of its citizen voting-age population. 
In each of the above scenarios, plaintiffs’ efforts to secure repre-
sentation are hindered by what can be described as race-biased de-
cision-making by the majority-group electorate.  Election outcomes 
“would have been different had the race of persons considered by 
the decisionmaker[s] been different.”24  Limiting Section 2 to the 
types of discrimination that presumptively violate the Constitution 
when undertaken by state actors probably excludes the fifth  
claim,25 but not the others.26   
 
23 For a review of the literature on racial resentment, including the debate over 
whether commonly used statistical measures of racial resentment capture race-specific 
views or ideological conservatism, see Leonie Huddy & Stanley Feldman, On Assessing 
the Political Effects of Racial Prejudice, 12 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 423 (2009). 
24 Elmendorf, supra note 1, at 384. 
25 The discrimination in the fifth case is facially race neutral and designed to better 
the socioeconomic opportunities and conditions of historically disadvantaged groups.  
This type of discrimination (or affirmative action), when undertaken by the State, is 
generally thought permissible.  See supra note 19.  To the extent that the fifth case in-
volves a use of race generally permitted to state actors, my Article’s shorthand defini-
tion of race-biased decisionmaking was overbroad.  I should have made more explicit 
my equation of race-biased decisionmaking with the uses of race that trigger strict scru-
tiny if the decisionmaker is a state actor. 
26 The fourth case is also a close call.  Though it would certainly be unconstitutional 
for the government to eliminate a social program “because of” the fact that most bene-
ficiaries are black, it would not be unconstitutional to eliminate the program “because 
of” the belief that hard work is all it takes to get ahead in our society.  Whether a court 
finds race-biased decisionmaking in the fourth case will depend on how it adjudicates 
the long-simmering dispute among social scientists about whether “racial resentment” 
metrics capture race discrimination or ideological conservatism.  For a review of this 
debate, see Huddy & Feldman, supra note 23, at 425. 
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Does it follow that courts must decide the other cases the same 
way?  No.  Section 2, properly understood, delegates authority to the 
courts to develop a common law of racially fair elections.  So long as 
the courts respect the basic normative and evidentiary guideposts out-
lined above,27 they have discretion to draw further normative or prac-
tical distinctions as they see fit.28  A court could reasonably hold, for 
example, that minority plaintiffs challenging the design of legislative 
districts must show a greater degree of exclusion—i.e., lack of repre-
sentation in proportion to the plaintiff group’s population share—if 
their representational impairment owes to white voters’ use of race as 
a proxy for ideology, as opposed to animus or negative stereotypes 
about minorities’ competence or integrity.29  A court might even de-
cide that if the plaintiffs’ only evidence of discrimination concerns 
statistically valid uses of race as a proxy for ideology, then plaintiffs 
may only seek remedies designed to improve voters’ access to non-
racial information about candidates, as opposed to reforming the 
basic arrangements for translating votes into representation.30  Such 
holdings, once made, would not be set in stone.  Rather, on the com-
mon law understanding of Section 2, the judiciary may revisit these 
holdings as conditions change and as appellate courts develop a better 
feel for how their doctrinal innovations work in practice. 
I wrote my Article to answer a three-pronged critique of Section 2.  
The critique holds that Section 2 is conceptually opaque, likely to ex-
acerbate racial conflict, and probably unconstitutional.  I provided a 
fresh account of Section 2’s constitutional function,31 one that aligns 
nicely with the conservative center’s understanding of the Equal Pro-
 
27 See supra text accompanying notes 7-12. 
28 To be sure, some such distinctions will be more defensible than others.  Follow-
ing the common law method, the courts should proceed incrementally.  Additionally, 
out of respect for legislative supremacy, the courts should be especially solicitous of 
claims that resemble the paradigmatic instances of vote dilution at the time that Con-
gress adopted the Section 2 results test.  And since the Section 2 results test incorpo-
rates by reference previous Supreme Court decisions, see Elmendorf, supra note 1, at 
409-10, the courts should pay attention to what the Supreme Court said in those cases 
as they apply the results test. 
29 For a discussion of voters’ use of racial cues as a proxy for other traits, see Monika 
L. McDermott, Race and Gender Cues in Low-Information Elections, 51 POL. RES. Q. 895 
(1998).  For a review of actual cross-racial differences in policy preferences, see Donald 
R. Kinder & Nicholas Winter, Exploring the Racial Divide:  Blacks, Whites, and Opinion on 
National Policy, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 439 (2001). 
30 For a brief discussion of potential informational remedies in Section 2 cases, see 
Elmendorf, supra note 1, at 443-44.  
31 See id. at 428-47 (discussing the problem of election outcomes that are  
unconstitutional because of race-biased voting, yet not judicially remediable in  
constitutional litigation). 
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tection Clause.32  I explained that the claim that Section 2 causes racial 
conflict has been undermined by political scientists’ findings about 
the consequences of minority electoral success,33 and I showed that 
Section 2 can support a heretofore unrecognized cause of action 
against electoral arrangements that unnecessarily induce or sustain 
voting on the basis of racial considerations.34  Finally, I demonstrated 
that Section 2, though often regarded as inscrutable, establishes norm-
ative, evidentiary, and legal-change norms that provide significant 
guidance to the courts.35   
The careful reader who has worked through my Article, the Re-
sponses by Professors Charles and Fuentes-Rohwer, and this Reply will 
ultimately agree, I hope, with two and a half of my conclusions.  Sec-
tion 2 is constitutional, even granting the normative and jurispruden-
tial premises of the conservative center.  Section 2 offers more salve 
than sting when it comes to racial conflict.  And—here dear reader 
please meet me halfway—Section 2, though leaving much  
unresolved, contains substantially more normative structure than  
its critics have perceived. 
 
 
Preferred Citation: Christopher S. Elmendorf, Response, What 
Kind of Discrimination Does the Voting Rights Act Target?, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. PENNUMBRA 357 (2012), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/ 
4-2012/Elmendorf.pdf. 
 
 
32 Professor Fuentes-Rohwer is absolutely correct in remarking that my account of 
Section 2 is “tailor-made for Justice Kennedy.”  Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Response, Justice 
Kennedy to the Rescue?, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 209, 216 (2012), http://www. 
pennumbra.com/responses/01-2012/FuentesRohwer.pdf.   
33 See Elmendorf, supra note 1, at 397 (summarizing research showing that “the 
election of out-group candidates tends to reduce biased voting by members of the in-
group and to diminish negative stereotyping of the out-group, so long as the out-group 
officeholders have incentives to respond to in-group concerns”). 
34 See id. at 420-21, 442 (arguing that plaintiffs should be able to bring “depolariza-
tion claims” under Section 2). 
35 See id. at 417-47. 
